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Abstract
We consider group decision-making on an optimal stopping problem, for which large 
and stable individual differences have previously been established. In the problem, 
people are presented with a sequence of five random numbers between 0 and 100, one 
at a time, and are required to choose the maximum of the sequence, without being al-
lowed to return to earlier values in the sequence. We examine group decision-making 
on these problems in an experimental setting where group members are isolated from 
one another, and interact solely via networked computers. The group members register 
their initial accept or reject decision for each value in the sequence, and then provide 
a potentially revised decision having viewed the recommendations of the other group 
members. Group decisions are made according to one of three conditions, requiring 
either consensus to accept from all group members, a majority of accept decisions from 
the group, or the acceptance of an appointed group leader. We compare individual 
decision-making to group decision-making under these three conditions, and find that, 
under some conditions, groups often significantly outperform even their best members. 
Using a signal detection analysis we provide an account of how the group decision-
making conditions differ from one another, and from individual decision-making. Key 
findings are that people do not often revise their decisions, but, in the consensus and 
leadership conditions, are more conservative in their initial decisions. This conservatism 
removes the individual bias towards choosing values too early in the sequence, allowing 
the groups to perform better than their individual members. In the majority condition, 
however, people continue to behave as they did individually, and the group shows the 
same bias in decision-making.
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Introduction
Optimal Stopping Problems
Most human decision-making can be conceived as searching through a sequence of 
alternatives until a choice is made. Often the number of possible alternatives considered 
is relatively small, because there are limited options in the external task environment, or 
because of the need to make fast decisions in a competitive world. In some situations, it 
is also not possible to re-consider a previously rejected alternative. In dynamic environ-
ments, previous evaluations may no longer be accurate, or—think, for example, of mate 
selection—the earlier act of rejection may incur large costs that make reconsideration 
prohibitive.
A class of optimization problems, generically known as optimal stopping problems 
(see Ferguson, 1989, for a historical overview), have features that make them well-suited 
to studying human decision-making on limited sequences of alternatives. For this rea-
son, these problems have received steady theoretical and empirical attention over a 
long period in cognitive psychology (e.g., Bearden, Murphy, & Rapoport, 2005; Corbin, 
Olson, & Abbondanza, 1975; Dudey & Todd, 2001; Kahan, Rapoport, & Jones, 1967; Lee, 
2006; Seale & Rapoport, 1997, 2000; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970) and other fields, such as 
experimental economics (e.g., Cox & Oaxaca, 1992; Kogut, 1990; Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, & 
Muthukrishnan, 2003)
In this paper, we consider human performance—both as individuals, and in vari-
ous group settings—on an optimal stopping problem where people are presented with 
a list of five randomly chosen numbers between 0 and 100. People are told there are 
five numbers in the list, and they were chosen randomly. Individuals or groups are then 
shown the numbers one at a time, and are instructed to choose the maximum, subject 
to the constraint that they must choose a number at the time it is presented, and that 
any choice below the maximum is incorrect.
Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) provide an integrated overview of mathematical results 
for optimal stopping problems. Most interestingly, they describe the optimal decision 
process, the adherence to which maximizes the probability of making the correct choice 
for any randomly generated problem. This optimal decision-making process is to choose 
the first value that is both the maximum value observed in the sequence thus far and 
exceeds a threshold level for its position in the sequence. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966, 
Tables 7 and 8) provide these optimal thresholds and the associated probabilities of 
making a correct decision.
As a concrete example, Figure 1 shows a five-point problem, with the circles repre-
senting successive values in the problem, and the solid line showing the optimal thresh-
old for each of the five positions (since the last value is a forced choice, its threshold is 
effectively zero). In this example, the optimal choice is the third value presented, as it 
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is the maximum value seen to that point in the sequence, and is above the threshold 
defined by the optimal curve. Note, however, that this choice is incorrect in the sense 
that it does not correspond to the maximum value in the sequence, which occurs in the 
fifth and final position. In this way, as argued previously by Lee (2006), optimal stop-
ping problems naturally distinguish between  performance based on achieving optimal 
outcomes (i.e., choosing the final value), and performance based on following optimal 
decision processes (i.e., choosing the third value). Simon (1976) termed these different 
measures “procedural” and “substantive” rationality, respectively, and noted that proce-
dural measures are inherently less noisy, because the optimal decision process can always 
be followed, even when optimal outcomes cannot always be achieved.
Individual Decision-Making
Most of the previous research examining human decision-making on optimal stopping 
problems has used versions of the problem that provide rank order information, rather 
Figure 1. An example optimal stopping problem, showing the sequence of five values 
between 0 and 100, and the curve corresponding to the optimal decision process.
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than the values themselves (e.g., Dudey & Todd, 2001; Seale & Rapoport, 1997, 2000). 
These rank order problems, however, have a very different optimal decision rule, and 
so it is unclear to what extent their findings generalize to the current context. Kahan et 
al. (1967) did study human decision-making on a more similar partial-information task, 
where values rather than ranks are presented, but the distribution is not explicitly given 
to participants. These authors used problems of length 200, with different problems 
involving values drawn from either a positively skewed, negatively skewed, or a uniform 
distribution. No evidence was found for the different distributions affecting the deci-
sions made. Corbin et al. (1975) considered human decision-making on problems like 
ours and, by systematically manipulating the values presented, found sequential and 
contextual dependencies within problems. Other empirical studies (e.g., Cox & Oaxaca, 
1992; Kogut, 1990; Rapoport & Tversky, 1970; Zwick et al., 2003) have used very different 
experimental methodologies, such as requiring subjects to expend resources to consider 
additional alternatives, usually because they are interested in applications to economic 
decision-making.
The series of studies most directly relevant to the current one were conducted by Lee, 
O’Connor, and Welsh (2004), Lee (2006), and Campbell and Lee (2006). Lee et al. (2004) 
considered human performance on problems with lengths 10, 20 and 50, and evaluated 
three candidate models of the way people made decisions. They concluded that the best 
accounts were provided by “threshold” models in which people choose by comparing 
the presented value to fixed thresholds. What Lee et al. (2004) observed, however, was 
that there seemed to be significant individual differences in the exact thresholds that 
people used. Some subjects behaved consistently with applying a single fixed threshold 
across the entire sequence. Effectively, these people chose the first number that exceeded 
a fixed value. Other subjects, however, behaved consistently with using thresholds that 
decreased as the sequence progressed, as with the optimal solution.
Lee (2006) examined the possibility of individual differences in more detail, observ-
ing that, over a total of 147 participants, each completing one of two different sets of 40 
problems, there was evidence of individual differences, but no evidence of learning. In 
other words, the proportion of times the optimal solution process was followed differed 
between participants, but did not appear to change as the same participant answered 
additional problems. In addition, based on a model of the decision-making process, Lee 
(2006) was able to make inferences about the various thresholds used by people, and 
observed a wide variety of different types of solution processes being employed. Campbell 
and Lee (2006) provided additional evidence of the stability of these individual differ-
ences by testing a total of 75 participants on 120 problems of length five, under various 
feedback and financial incentive conditions, and observing no evidence of learning in 
any of the conditions.
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Group Decision-Making
The finding of large and stable individual differences in decision-making raises a num-
ber of interesting questions about how groups will solve optimal stopping problems. 
Because people make different decisions as individuals, group decision-making must 
involve some sort of compromise across, or competition between, alternative answers. 
And because people show few signs of learning or changing their decision-making on 
these problems over repeated trials, it is not obvious how such compromise or competi-
tion will be resolved.
A further attraction of studying group behavior on the optimal stopping problem is 
that it has many desirable properties previously identified in the group decision-making 
literature. As Gigone and Hastie (1997) point out, most laboratory tasks involving group 
decision-making have required background knowledge, which is difficult to quantify. In 
contrast, the lack of background knowledge required to solve optimal stopping problems 
makes them amenable to quantitative analysis. In addition, an important question in the 
study of group decision-making is whether groups attenuate or exacerbate individual 
decision-making bias (see Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 634). To do this, as noted by Gigone 
and Hastie (1997), it is necessary to be able to collect repeated measures of individual and 
group decision-making. The optimal stopping task is also well suited to these demands. 
It is straightforward to generate and administer large numbers of essentially equivalent 
but new problems.
As far as we are aware, however, group decision-making on optimal stopping prob-
lems has never been considered experimentally (see the thorough experimental reviews 
in Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hastie, 1986). The only previous empirical study to consider 
group effects of any form is that reported by Kahan et al. (1967). These authors com-
pared the performance of individuals making optimal stopping decisions in an isolated 
setting with those still making decisions as individuals, but in a group setting under the 
condition that they had to remain in the experimental setting until the entire group had 
completed their problems. Not surprisingly, they found that in the group setting people 
chose to accept values earlier in the sequence than they did in isolation.
In this paper, we examine the decision-making of individuals, and groups of five 
people, completing five-point optimal stopping problems. We consider three within-
group manipulations, involving consensus, majority and leadership-based decision-mak-
ing for the group. Following the framework suggested by Gigone and Hastie (1997), we 
distinguish between “individual” decisions made in isolation, “member” decisions made 
at the beginning of a group process, “revised member” decisions made after interaction 
with the other members of a group, and the final “group” decision. We adopt a signal-
detection theory approach to provide measures of both accuracy and bias on detailed 
decision-by-decision performance. We then use these measures to examine how decision 
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making evolves in a group setting, how different group decision processes differ from 
one other, and how they differ from those of individual decision-makers.
Experiment
Participants
We tested seven groups of five participants, comprised of 13 male and 22 female partici-
pants, with an average age of 24.4 (SD = 9.10) years. Participants were  randomly assigned 
to groups, with gender and age distributions that broadly matched those of the entire 
sample. All participants were compensated with a 20 Australian dollar voucher.
Procedure
Individual Setting. Participants first completed a set of 20 problems working as individuals. 
For each problem participants were sequentially presented with numbers ranging from 
0.00 to 100.00, and were instructed to choose the maximum value. It was emphasized 
that (a) the values were uniformly and randomly distributed between 0.00 and 100.00, (b) 
a value could only be chosen at the time it was presented, (c) the goal was to select the 
maximum value, with any selection below the maximum being completely incorrect, and 
(d) if no choice had been made when the last value was presented, they would be forced 
to choose this value. As each value was presented, its position in the sequence (e.g., the 
information that “this is the third number out of five”) was shown, together with “yes” and 
“no” response buttons. No feedback was provided, no rewards were given dependent on 
performance, and the order of the problems was randomized for each participant.
Group Setting. Participants then completed a total of 30 problems working as a member 
of a five-person group, with each person located remotely at a computer terminal and 
interacting only through the networked software that ran the experiment. For each 
successive number in each problem, this software showed the number, and its position 
in the sequence, to all members of the group, and asked for a member accept or reject 
decision. This decision was made by each group member in isolation, without knowledge 
of the decisions of the other members. Once all  member decisions had been made, the 
software provided a graphical representation of the decisions to all group members. 
Each participant was then asked for a revised member accept or reject decision for the 
same number.
Over their experimental session, each group operated under three decision-making 
conditions, which we call “consensus,” “majority,” and “leadership” conditions, and did 
ten problems in each condition. In the consensus condition, everybody in the group was 
required to make an accept decision at the member stage for that value to be chosen 
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by the group as a whole. In the majority condition, three or more of the group had to 
accept the value for it to be chosen by the group. In the leadership condition, the one 
group member who was appointed leader made a decision at the member stage that 
became the group decision for that value. Leaders were assigned at random, and were 
changed, without reselecting the same person, for each problem set. Whatever the con-
dition, the accept or reject decision generated by each group for each value was treated 
in the same way as the individual decision-making setting. That is, groups continued to 
be presented with values in the problem sequence until one was selected, or the last 
value became a forced choice.
The basic group decision-making process is summarized in Figure 2. The five mem-
bers of the group are shown, making decisions in relation to the presented value. A 
sample progression through member to revised member decisions is shown. From the 
revised member decisions, the group decision is determined by the consensus, majority or 
leadership condition rule. For this reason, in the leadership condition, a revised member 
decision was only required from the assigned leader. Each group did different randomly 
generated problems, and the order of the decision-making  conditions was counterbal-
anced, to the maximum extent possible, across groups.
Figure 2. Overview of the basic experimental procedure for group decision-making, 
showing an example sequence of member and revised member decisions, from which 
the group decision is determined.
The Journal of Problem Solving •
60 Michael D. Lee and Michael J. Paradowski
Basic Results
Figure 3 summarizes the accuracy of the decisions made by individuals and groups, both 
in terms of making optimal decisions, and in choosing the maximum value. This analysis 
makes clear a few basic conclusions. First, there are large differences in accuracy between 
individuals, and between groups using the same decision-making method. Any analysis 
of decision-making accordingly needs to accommodate individual differences. Secondly, 
there seem to be differences between the accuracy of groups and those of individuals. 
In particular, many consensus and leadership groups adhere perfectly to the optimal 
decision process, a feat no single individual achieved. Taken together, these observations 
suggest that there are differences between individual and group decision-making, and 
between different group decision-making conditions.
Figure 3. Proportion of optimal decisions against proportion of maximum values chosen, 
for individual participants, and for each decision-making condition. Each point has been 
slightly perturbed for visibility.
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Signal Detection Analysis
We use signal detection analysis to explore the differences in individual and group deci-
sion-making in more detail. In particular, we want to relate individual and group decisions 
to those dictated by the optimal decision process. And we want to think of individual and 
group decisions in terms of the two basic outputs of signal detection analysis. The first is a 
measure of discriminability that describes the level of optimality in decision-making. The 
second is a measure of bias that describes, to the extent decision-making is not optimal, 
how individuals and groups deviate from optimality.
To do this, we conceive of values that the optimal decision process would accept as 
“signal” trials, and those values that it would reject as “noise” trials. We can then relate the 
behavioral data—the individual, member, revised member, and group accept and reject 
decisions—to optimal decision-making as shown in Table 1. Hits are values that should 
be accepted and are; false alarms are values that should be rejected but are accepted; 
misses are values that should be accepted but are rejected; and correct rejections are 
values that should be rejected and are.
To analyze the data in Table 1 we develop a hierarchical extension of standard signal 
detection theory that is able to accommodate individual differences, and incorporates 
base-rate information about the prior likelihood of accept and reject decisions.
Table 1. Signal detection table relating human decisions to the optimal 
decision process.
Optimal Decision
accept  reject 
Human accept  hit  false alarm
Decision reject miss correct rejection
Standard Signal Detection Theory
At the heart of our signal detection analysis is the standard Gaussian equal-variance form 
of Signal Detection Theory (SDT: see Green & Swets, 1966; MacMillan & Creelman, 2004, 
for detailed treatments). The key assumptions of  SDT are shown in Figure 4, and involve 
representation and decision-making. The representational assumption is that signal and 
noise trials can be represented as values along a single “strength” dimension. Both types 
of trials are assumed to produce strengths that vary according to a Gaussian distribu-
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tion, with different means but the same variance, along this dimension. The difference 
between the means, denoted d', is a measure of discriminability, since it describes how 
well separated the signal trials are from the noise trials.
The decision-making assumption of SDT is that accept and reject decisions are 
produced by comparing the strength of the current stimulus to a fixed criterion, k. If the 
strength exceeds the criterion an accept decision is made, otherwise a reject decision is 
made. This means the model naturally makes predictions about hit rates and false alarm 
rates, and so maps naturally onto the counts in Table 1. In Figure 4, the hit rate, θ
h
, is shown 
as the proportion of the signal distribution above the criterion k. Similarly, the false alarm 
rate, �θ
f
, is the proportion of the noise distribution above the criterion k.
Figure 4. Standard signal detection theory framework.
The criterion k can be reexpressed in terms of a bias measure β, which is the ratio 
of the density of the signal to noise distributions at k, or in terms of the difference c 
between the k and the unbiased criterion value. We prefer the c measure, because it is 
argued to be independent of discriminability (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), and is naturally 
interpreted. Positive values of c corresponding to a bias towards reject decisions, and 
so to an increase in correct rejections at the expense of  an increase in misses. Negative 
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values of c correspond to a bias towards accept decisions, and so to an increase in hits 
at the expense of an increase in false alarms.
One subtlety in our analysis is that a decision-maker following the optimal process 
will not encounter an equal number of signal and noise trials. This unequal base-rate 
will influence the unbiased criterion value that is used to define the c measure of bias. 
To find the required base-rate, we applied the optimal decision process to 105 randomly 
generated problems, and found that the first, second, third, fourth and fifth values were 
chosen about 50%, 16%, 7%, 5% and 22% of the time, respectively. This pattern of choices 
means that each presented value has a prior probability of about 0.43 of being a value 
that should be rejected, and a 0.57 prior probability of being a value that should be ac-
cepted. We used this base-rate of accept to reject values to define the unbiased criterion, 
and hence our c measure of bias (see MacMillan & Creelman, 2004).
Extending Signal Detection Theory to Groups
While standard signal detection provides an account of the discriminability and bias of a 
single decision-maker (whether a single individual, or a single group), it does not provide 
any formal account of a collection of decision-makers.1 Given the large individual differ-
ences already noted, we want to compare the distributions of discriminability and bias for 
collections of individual, member, revised member and group decisions. To achieve this, 
we use a hierarchical Bayesian signal detection theory framework (Rouder & Lu, 2005). 
The technical details of our statistical methods are available as an online technical note 
from the first author’s web page.
The hierarchical model extends basic signal detection theory by including an extra 
level of representation that describes how the discriminability and bias  characteristics 
for a collection of decision-makers are distributed. Specifically, we assume these distribu-
tions are Gaussian, and that discriminability and bias are independent. Using standard 
statistical methods, we can then make inferences from the counts in Table 1 about the 
discriminability and bias of the decision-maker, but also about the mean and variance of 
the discriminabilities and biases of a collection of decision-makers. In turn, we can use 
standard statistical methods to test whether two collections of decision-makers are the 
same or different in their discriminability and bias distributions.
Individual and Group Behavior
Figure 5 summarizes the results of applying the hierarchical signal detection model to 
the individual decisions and group decisions. The three panels correspond to the con-
sensus, majority and leadership group decision-making conditions. Within each panel, 
crosses show the expected discriminability (d' ) and bias (c) derived from the decisions 
made by each of the 35 individuals, and circular, square or triangular makers show the 
expected discriminability and bias for each of the seven groups. Also shown are the 
The Journal of Problem Solving •
64 Michael D. Lee and Michael J. Paradowski
50% and 95% contours for the expected Gaussian distributions over the individuals 
and the groups.
Table 2 details the Bayes Factors (see Kass & Raftery, 1995) that test whether the 
discriminability and bias distributions are the same or different in each case. The Bayes 
Factors are measured on the often-used logarithmic scale. On this  scale, zero is the point 
of indifference: the point at which the data provide as much evidence for the distributions 
being the same as they do for the distributions being different. Positive values indicate 
evidence in favor of the distributions being the same, while negative values indicate 
evidence of a difference. Because the values themselves are simply the logarithm of a 
likelihood ratio, they are readily interpreted. We follow the suggested guide of Kass and 
Raftery (1995), where (absolute) values less than one are regarded as “not worth more 
than a bare mention,” values between one and three are regarded as “positive,” between 
three and five are regarded as “strong,” and larger than five are regarded as “very strong.” 
We are particularly interested in cases where individual and group decision-making 
differ, and so Table 2 highlight in bold those log Bayes Factors that are negative, with a 
magnitude greater than one.
Table 2 shows that the consensus and leadership groups have different levels of 
both discrimination and bias to individuals. With reference to Figure 5, it is clear that 
discriminability improves in both group settings. It is also evident that a large negative 
bias for individuals is reduced to something close to an unbiased state in the consensus 
condition, and is also reduced, but to a lesser extent, in the leadership condition.
Figure 5. Individual and group behavior under each of the decision-making conditions. 
Within each panel, markers show the expected discriminability (d' ) and bias (c) derived 
from the decisions made by each individual and each group. Superimposed are the 
50% and 95% contours for the expected Gaussian distribution over individuals and the 
groups.
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Table 2. Log Bayes factors testing whether individual vs group, individual vs member, and 
member vs revised member decision-making have the same or different discriminability 
(d') and bias (c) characteristics. Positive values give evidence in favor of sameness; negative 
values give evidence in favor of differences. Negative values indicating substantial differ-
ences are highlighted in bold.
  Discriminability (d')   Bias (c) 
 Consensus Majority Leadership Consensus Majority Leadership
individual vs group –7.10 1.89 –7.64 –4.97 0.98 –1.83
individual vs member –3.66 0.81 –5.53 –4.72 0.66 –2.66
member vs revised member –0.24 1.82 0.60 0.66 0.37 0.61 
Individual Behavior in Groups
To consider the sequence of decisions each participant made—moving from their deci-
sions as individuals to their decisions as members to their revised member  decisions in 
group settings—we use a “within-subjects” version of the hierarchical signal detection 
analysis. This involves, instead of considering separate discriminability and bias measures 
for both member and revised member decisions, considering the change in discriminabil-
ity Δd' and change in bias Δc between these stages for each individual.
Figure 6 summarizes the results of applying the hierarchical signal detection model 
to the individual to member changes. Table 2 gives the Bayes Factors, which compare 
an account that assumes there is no change in discriminability and bias, with one that 
does allow for the change. As before, the Bayes Factors are measured on the log scale, 
and negative values indicate evidence for change. From these analyses, it is clear that in 
both the consensus and leadership decision-making conditions, but not in the majority 
condition, there is a change in discriminability and bias. In particular, the decisions people 
make as members show greater discriminability. It is also clear, with reference to Figure 
5, that the increase in the value of the bias measure in the consensus and leadership 
condition has the effect of making the member decisions much closer to being unbiased 
than the individual decisions.
Figure 7 summarizes the results of applying the hierarchical signal detection model 
to the member to revised member changes, and Table 2 again gives the log Bayes Fac-
tors. None of the log Bayes Factors find evidence for change in either discriminability 
or bias for any of the conditions. This suggests that there are no significant changes in 
basic nature of the decisions people make when their member decisions are updated 
to revised member decisions, having been informed by seeing the member decisions of 
the remainder of their group.
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Figure 6. Changes from individual to member behavior under each of the decision-mak-
ing conditions. Within each panel, markers show the expected change in discriminability 
(Δd' ) and change in bias (Δc) derived for each participant moving from their individual 
to their member decision-making. Superimposed are the 50% and 95% contours for the 
expected Gaussian distribution over the collection of differences.
Analysis of Changes
The finding that there are no major changes in discriminability or bias in revising member 
decisions does not mean that it is not worth examining those changes that do occur. Such 
an analysis is presented in Figure 8, which shows the proportion of changes, relative to 
the total number of decisions in that condition, in each decision-making condition. These 
changes are shown according to whether they are “good” changes (i.e., changes that 
Figure 7. Changes from member to revised member behavior under each of the deci-
sion-making conditions. Within each panel, markers show the expected change in dis-
criminability (Δd') and change in bias (Δc) derived for each participant moving from their 
member to their revised member decision-making. Superimposed are the 50% and 95% 
contours for the expected Gaussian distribution over the collection of differences.
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changed a member decision not in accord with the optimal rule into a revised member 
decision that was in accord), or “bad” changes (i.e., changes away from a member deci-
sion in accord with the optimal rule). These good and bad changes are shown further 
divided into those where the subject was “encouraged” to change a member reject into 
a revised member accept decision, and those where the subject was “discouraged” to 
change a member accept into a revised member reject decision.
Figure 8 shows that, under the consensus and majority condition, only about 15% of 
decisions were changed moving from the member to the revised member  stage of the 
decision-making process. In the leadership condition, the leader changed their member 
decision about 20% of the time. These changes were much more often good changes 
than bad ones, especially in the leadership condition. The good changes were more often 
discouragements than encouragements, again especially in the leadership condition. 
And, finally, bad changes were almost exclusively encouragements.
Figure 8. Analysis of changes in member to revised member decisions. The three panels 
show, top to bottom, the consensus, majority, and leadership conditions. Each panel 
shows the number of “good” and “bad” changes for five, ten and twenty point problems. 
These counts are further divided into how many changes were “encouragements” versus 
“discouragements.”
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Individual Learning
Our final analysis examines the possibility that individuals learned while completing their 
20 problems. While previous results strongly suggest there will be no learning, it is an 
important check, because otherwise the comparison of group and individual decision-
making would be confounded with practise effects. Figure 9 shows the results of a within-
participants hierarchical signal detection analysis of the change in discriminability and 
bias between the first and second sets of ten problems completed by each participants. 
It seems clear that there is no evidence of change in either discriminability or bias. The 
log Bayes Factors comparing the change model to one that assumes no change support 
this conclusions, showing evidence in favor of the no-change model of 1.93 for discrim-
inability and 1.65 for bias.
Figure 9. Change in individual discriminability and bias between the first 10 and second 
10 problems completed. The markers show the expected change in discriminability (Δd') 
and change in bias (Δc) for each participant between the first and second blocks of 10 
problems. Superimposed are the 50% and 95% contours for the expected Gaussian dis-
tribution over the collection of differences.
Discussion
Individual Decision-Making
Our data for individual decision-making on the optimal stopping problem replicate all 
of the important findings that made group decision-making on the problem interesting. 
The raw data analysis in Figure 3 and the hierarchical signal detection analysis in Figure 
5 both show large individual differences. The within-participants comparison of the first 
half or individual trials against the second half, as shown in Figure 9, shows no evidence 
of learning. And there is clear evidence that individuals tend to make choices too early 
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in the sequence. Using signal detection theory, this can be seen most clearly in Figure 
5, which shows that the bias for the individuals errs on the lenient side of optimal deci-
sion-making.
Group and Individual Performance
Previous empirical findings for group decision-making on cognitive tasks have found 
considerable evidence that groups, typically with sizes between three and seven, rarely 
outperform their best members (see, for example, the reviews of Hastie & Kameda, 2005; 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Our data, in contrast, provide intriguing evidence that, under various 
circumstances, and to various extents, group decision-making can correct an individual 
bias of choosing too early in the optimal stopping problem.
This is clear in the analysis of the raw data in Figure 3, particularly when measuring 
participants’ decision-making with respect to optimal processes rather than chance-in-
fluenced outcomes. In this way, we observe an improvement in discriminability for some 
group decision-making conditions over individual decision-making, to the extent that 
some groups clearly out-perform their best member. Hastie and Kameda (2005) suggest 
those examples showing superior group-decision typically use tasks in which different 
group members having different pieces of relevant information, or allowing one or more 
individuals in a group has the opportunity to convince the others of the “correctness” 
of their decision. Those explanations are clearly not applicable here. An obvious differ-
ence between our study and many previous ones (as reviewed, for example, by Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004), is that group members all had exactly the same information available, 
and interacted only in the most limited of ways, by viewing each others accept or reject 
member decisions. These characteristics of the task preclude information pooling, and 
also do not support any deliberation process.
Insights from Signal Detection Analysis
Our use of hierarchical signal detection theory to analyze the entire sequence of accept 
and reject decisions provides a series of useful insights into the how the group condi-
tions differ. In particular, it is able to isolate where in the decision-making process group 
decision-making diverges from being simply the combined decisions of a collection of 
independent individuals.
It is clear that in the consensus condition that member decisions are significantly 
more conservative than those made by the same participants as individuals. In addition, 
the consensus condition is inherently conservative, since it requires all members of the 
group to agree on an accept decision. Taken together, the left panel of Figure 5 shows that 
group decision-making is now essentially unbiased, and with improved discriminability.
In the leadership condition, member decisions are again significantly more con-
servative than the individual decisions. After these member decisions are viewed, the 
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analysis of changes in Figure 8 shows the leader is sometimes further discouraged from 
their member accept decision, and this change is always a good one. Taken together 
with the initially more conservative member decision, the right panel of Figure 5 shows 
that these trends make the leadership group decisions much less biased, and also show 
improved discriminability.
In the majority condition, however, the behavior is quite different. There is no 
evidence that member decisions are different from individual ones, nor, indeed, that 
the group decisions differ in discriminability or bias from the individual decisions. In 
this sense, in the majority condition, the group behaves as a collection of individuals, 
whereas the consensus and leadership groups behave differently from the sum of their 
individual parts.
Our findings suggest, though, that where consensus and leadership group deci-
sion-making differs from individual decision-making is not where it might have been 
predicted. A straightforward prediction would be that individual and member decisions 
would be extremely similar, since the same information is available to the decision-maker 
in both circumstances, but that revised member decisions might be different, because 
of the additional information provided by seeing the recommendation of other group 
members. Our analysis makes very clear, however, that it is at the member stage that 
decisions differ, and relatively few revisions are made from that point onwards. This 
makes it difficult to explain the large changes in group decision-making in term of group 
polarization effects that have been a central focus in social group decision-making (e.g., 
Moscovici & Zavolline, 1969).
Accountability in Group Decision-Making
The difference between individual and member decisions in general, and the differ-
ent (and inferior) behavior of the majority condition are interesting, and requires some 
explanation. This is particularly true since there is some evidence and advocacy2 for the 
effectiveness of a majority rule in the existing literature (e.g., Hastie & Kameda, 2005; 
Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001). The basic theoretical idea is that majority rules have the at-
traction of serving to amplify moderately correct individual decisions, especially in cases 
where the individual decisions are not strongly correlated.
One possible reason for this is that majority condition is the only one in which a 
member’s decision is not necessarily directly responsible for a group decision. The leader’s 
decision is the group decision, and it seems likely other members assume the leader will 
scrutinize their recommendation. In the consensus condition, all members must agree, 
and so everybody is directly accountable for an accept decision. In the majority condition, 
in contrast, the responsibility for both accept and reject decisions by the group can only 
be attributed to a collection of group members, and never to one individual.
Perhaps this lack of direct accountability is the reason the majority condition seems 
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to differ from the other two. Such a line of argument seems related to the issue of group 
motivational gains, where group members exert greater effort than as individuals. Ex-
isting demonstrations of this effect (see Kerr & Tindale, 2004, p. 628, for an overview) 
typically involve different group decision-making situations, of a more inherently social 
nature. Nevertheless, at least one element believed to be important in these situations, 
that of social comparison, seems likely to be present  in our experimental procedure. In 
group decision-making, member decisions are effectively individual decisions that will be 
seen by others. It is especially interesting, therefore, that when member decisions must 
coincide with the group decision in the consensus condition, or must be evaluated by a 
leader, people become more conservative, but the mere visibility of a member decision 
in the majority decision does not produce the same change.
Conclusion
We have presented an analysis of group decision-making, under three different decision-
making conditions, on a well-controlled and easily measured optimal stopping task for 
which there are stable individual differences. Our primary finding is that, in the group 
setting, the decisions of individuals, for this task at least, are quite different from those 
they supplied as individuals, under conditions where their initial decision can be account-
ably linked to the decision of the group. This is, perhaps a surprising finding, especially 
given the fact that our participants had no interaction with one another in revising their 
decisions, and, in fact, were socially isolated from other group members, and that the 
task dealt with abstract stimuli in a mathematically described task. It may be the case, 
therefore, that the effect we observed is a pervasive one across more real-world stimuli 
and social settings. If true more generally, our findings suggest that theories and models 
of group decision-making on even abstract cognitive tasks need to focus not only on is-
sues of information pooling and deliberation, but also on the latent effects merely being 
in a group have upon the decision-making of individuals.
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Notes
1. Sorkin, Shenghua, and Itzkowitz (2004) use an extended version of signal detection theory 
to analyze group decision-making, but their extension relates to the issue of updating 
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signal detection theory parameters based on information from other group members. 
This is an interesting and worthwhile extension, but is orthogonal to the issue we are ad-
dressing, which requires the accommodation of individual differences in signal detection 
theory parameters across individuals at any one point in the evolution of their decision-
making.
2. Sorkin et al. (2004) advocated consensus group decision-making, but for the very different 
circumstance involving extensive information-sharing and deliberation.
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